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Abstract 
The tensions between intra-EU BITS and EU law have become increasingly visible:  they 
involve national and transnational courts, arbitral tribunals and courts in third states, and 
arise in a variety of procedural settings and with increasing intensity. Written at time 
when questions about the very foundations of the interactions between EU and intra-EU 
BITs have been raised before the European Court of Justice, this article highlights the 
legal and policy factors that may explain the intensity of the current dilemmas. It reflects 
on the maximalist and polemical approach that a number of actors have adopted over the 
years, and points out the pitfalls of ignoring the usefulness of pragmatism and comity.  
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1  Introduction 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the attribution of express external compe-
tence to the European Union (EU) in the area of foreign direct investment added a layer 
of complexity to the relationship between EU and international investment law. This has 
been compounded by the increasingly prominent, seductively ill-defined and apparently 
ever expanding principle of autonomy of EU law that has emerged from the case-law of 
the European Court of Justice. Coupled with the confident approach of the European 
Commission to the development of the EU’s investment policy and the, at times, aloof 
response of arbitral tribunals to EU-law based arguments, these developments have 
thrown the challenges of the interactions between EU and international investment law 
into sharp relief. At the time of writing, there are cases pending before the Court of Jus-
 2 
tice about the fundamentals of the relationship between intra-EU bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and EU law. The fact that these cases have arisen in different disputes and 
in various procedural settings (enforcement actions, preliminary reference, annulment 
proceedings) illustrates the topicality and urgency of the underlying issues.  
This article does not aim to provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the var-
ious arguments about the role of EU law in disputes brought before investment tribunals. 
This has been done frequently and well.
1
 Instead, the aim of this analysis is narrower. On 
the one hand, it will tease out some broad themes from the position that a number of ac-
tors in intra-EU BITs disputes have taken on the relevance of EU law. On the other hand, 
it will highlight the legal and policy factors that may explain the intensity of the current 
dilemmas on the interactions between EU and international investment law.  
 
2. The One End of the Spectrum: The Maximalist Flavor of the Inapplicability Ob-
jection 
The consistency with which Member States and the European Commission have raised 
the objection of inapplicability of intra-EU BITS in arbitration proceedings may only be 
compared to the consistency with which arbitral tribunals have rejected it. Different ar-
guments have been put forward to substantiate this objection, a striking one being the 
automatic termination of the relevant agreements following accession to the EU by both 
its parties. The force and consistency with which this argument has been made varies. In 
Eastern Sugar, for instance, whilst the Czech Republic raised it, the European Commis-
sion put forward submissions which were viewed by the Arbitral Tribunal ‘for the most 
part diplomatic and ambiguous’ and which suggested that automatic termination was not 
advocated.
2
 In the more recent Micula case, however, the Commission argued that ‘the 
E.U. Treaties superseded the Sweden-Romania BIT as a result of Romania’s accession to 
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1
  For post-Lisbon analysis, see, for instance, Jan A Bischoff, ‘Just a Little BIT of “Mixity”? The EU’s 
Role in the Field of International Investment Protection Law’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1527, Angelos 
Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (OUP 2011), Philip Strik, Shaping the Single European 
Market in the Field of Foreign Direct Investment (Hart 2014).  
2
  Eastern Sugar BV (Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, SCC Case No 088/2004, Partial Award (27 
March 2007), para 119 (the quote is from para 120).  
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the European Union, terminating the latter, or, at the very least, rendering Articles 7 and 
10 of that BIT inapplicable’.3 
As a matter of principle, this objection
4
 may not be surprising in the light of norma-
tive and policy considerations. The former are about the principle of autonomy of EU law 
that, in the light of the recent case-law of the Court of Justice (for instance in Opinion 
1/09
5
 and Opinion 2/13
6
) has been construed in increasingly broad terms.
7
 The policy 
factor is about the competence of the Union to carry out an investment policy, not least 
pursuant to the revamped provision of Article 207(1) TFEU. It is also about the emerging 
policy that the EU has been seeking to define both internally and externally. The former 
is shaped by the grandfathering
8
 and financial responsibility
9
 Regulations as well as the 
                                                      
3
  Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRL and SC Multipack SRL v Ro-
mania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/20, Decision on Annulment (26 Februar 2016) para 330 (referring 
to para 92 of the Commission’s submission). See also Commission Decision 2015/1470 [2015] OJ L 
232/43 at para 102. In another recent case, Poland did not make this argument: Enkev Beheer B.V. v 
Poland, PCA Case No 2013-01, Partial Award (29 April 2014)  
4
  See the discussion in August Reinisch, ‘Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention 0n the Law of 
Treaties in Action: The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment Arbi-
trations’ (2012) 39 LIEI 157. 
5
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6
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ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
7
  For an analysis of the principle in the context of investment law, see Steffen Hindelang, ‘The Au-
tonomy of the European Legal Order – EU Constitutional Limits to Investor-State Arbitration on the 
Basis of Future EU Investment-Related Agreements’ (2013) 4 Eur YBIEL 187. 
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  Regulation 1219/2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements 
between Member States and third countries [2013] OJ L 351/40.  
9
  Regulation 912/2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to inves-
tor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the Euro-
pean Union is party [2014] OJ L 257/121. See Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 'Financial Responsibility in 
European International Investment Policy' (2014) 63 ICLQ 449. 
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policy document Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy.
10
 
The latter relate to the investment chapters in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement with Canada and the Agreements with Singapore and Vietnam, the negotia-
tion of investment chapters in agreements with India, Malaysia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia, and the negotiation of standalone agreements with China and Myanmar. 
This gradually emerging policy would be buttressed by comprehensive claims about the 
invalidity of existing intra-EU BITs.  
There is, however, a whiff of maximalism about this objection. On the one hand, this 
approach raises the wider issue of how the EU places itself in relation to other interna-
tional legal regimes: in a widely decentralized and multilayered international order, the 
invalidity objection seeks to eliminate a form of international adjudication central to this 
policy area without ensuring first that no other way of co-existence would be possible. As 
such, it appears to support claims about the uneasiness of the EU’s executive and judici-
ary regarding the Union’s place in the wider international legal order (I shall return to this 
point below).  
On the other hand, the argument about the automatic termination of intra-EU BITs 
may raise some more specific legal issues. First, it marginalises the significance of the 
termination procedures in BITs. By disregarding the international law nature of the rules 
which it deems to be contrary to EU law, the Commission’s argument does not sit com-
fortably with the approach that the Court of Justice has adopted in a similar context. It is 
recalled that, in its effort to reconcile the pre-existing international obligations of Mem-
ber States with EU law pursuant to Article 351 TFEU, the Court places considerable em-
phasis on full compliance of the international rules on the termination of the relevant trea-
ty concluded by the Member State.
11
 In doing so, the Court of Justice takes the rule laid 
down in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties seriously. Viewed 
from this angle, the decision of the Commission to tackle the question of the compatibil-
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  COM (2010) 343 (Brussels, 7 July 2010). 
11
  See, for instance, CJEU, Case C-478/07, Budvar [2009] ECR I-7721. 
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ity of intra-EU BITs directly by bringing enforcement actions against certain Member 
States is, in normative terms, preferable.
12
 
Secondly, the objection of invalidity is at odds with the Court’s own approach to 
succession of treaties as a matter of EU law. It is recalled that only in relation to GATT 
1947 did the Court accept, back in the early 1970s, that the Member States had passed on 
the European Economic Community, as it then was, the rights and obligations they had 
assumed pursuant to GATT 1947.13 Admittedly, the two cases are not entirely similar: 
the latter case was about whether the Community was bound by an agreement concluded 
by its Member States, whereas, in relation to intra-EU BITs, the Commission has been 
seeking to fend off challenges against Member States pursuant to an international treaty 
by arguing for the invalidity of the latter in the light of EU law. There is, however, an 
analogy to be made between the two legal contexts in so far as they tell us how they EU 
deals with the legal effects of successive international treaties of potentially overlapping 
scope. Put differently, at the core of both legal contexts the main issue is whether an 
agreement concluded by the Member States has been subsumed by EU law (in the case of 
intra-EU BITS rendering them invalid, whereas in the context of other agreements bind-
ing the EU itself). It is recalled that, in dealing with the principle of treaty succession, the 
Court of Justice has adopted an extremely narrow approach:14 it is only where the EU 
has assumed ‘all the powers previously exercised by the Member States that fall within 
the convention in question’ that the Union has succeeded the Member States in relation to 
the rights and obligations laid down in the latter.15 This strand of case-law suggests that 
                                                      
12
  The Commission initiated proceedings against Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and 
Sweden in June 2015, whilst it requested information from the remaining 21 Member States (Ireland 
and Italy have terminated their intra-EU BITs).  
13
  CJEU, Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company [1972] ECR I-1219. 
14
  See the analysis in Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (2nd edn, Hart2015) 212-219 
and Robert Schuetze, ‘The “Succession Doctrine” and the European Union’ in Anthony Arnull et al 
(eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart 2011) 459.  
15
  CJEU, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America (ATAA) [2011] ECR I-13755 para 63 
regarding the Convention on International Civil Aviation. See also CJEU, C-301/08 Bogiatzi [2009] 
ECR I-10185. about the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air; Case C-379/92, Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453 para. 16. and Case C-308/06, Inter-
 6 
the powers and obligations laid down in a treaty concluded by the Member States would 
be ‘subsumed’ by the Union pursuant to the EU Treaties if there is a complete overlap 
between the provisions of the former and the latter.  
Is there such an overlap between the intra-EU BITs and the EU Treaties so as to sug-
gest that the former are rendered invalid by the latter? The answer is far from clear-cut, as 
the legal landscape of investment policy as a matter of EU law is somewhat elusive. The 
Commission is keen to stress the wide scope and exclusive nature of the Union’s compe-
tence in the area of investment and to underline the significance to that effect of the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the scope and nature of the Union’s compe-
tence is far from clear, a fact that the pending request for an Opinion on the conclusion of 
the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement illustrates rather starkly.
16
 To raise a specific 
point about Title IV Chapter 4 on capitaI and payments: is the competence these provi-
sions confer on the EU exclusive in relation to portfolio investment? Article 64(2) TFEU 
confers competence ‘in respect of the movement of capital to or from third countries in-
volving direct investment – including in real estate – establishment, the provision of fi-
nancial services or the admission of securities to capital markets’. Measures adopted on 
the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets govern 
aspects of portfolio investment and may, therefore, have an impact on the rules governing 
it. They do not, however, cover all aspects of portfolio investment,
17
 the latter being de-
fined by the Court ‘the acquisition of shares on the capital market solely with the inten-
tion of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management 
and control of the undertaking (‘portfolio’ investments)’. 18  The scope of regulatory 
measures, therefore, that may affect portfolio investment is broad and does not appear to 
be covered fully by the competence conferred in Article 64(2) TFEU. In the light of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
tanko [2008] ECR I-4057, para. 48 about the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-
tion from Ships of 1973, as supplemented by the Protocol of 17 February 1978; Case C-481/13, 
Qurbani ECLI:EU:C:2014:2101 about Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 
January 1967 relating to the status of refugees. 
16
  CJEU, Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (pending).  
17
  See Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 150. 
18
  CJEU, Case C-182/08, Glaxo Wellcome [2009] ECR I-8591 para 40 
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above, the invalidity objection raised in relation to intra-EU BITs is not fully substantiat-
ed.  
Thirdly, the invalidity objection appears to conflate the issue of competence with that 
of compatibility. It does not follow that the existence or emergence of EU competence 
would necessarily and automatically render other rules binding on Member States inva-
lid.
19
 This confusion between competence and compatibility with EU law in cases where 
EU law interacts with other international legal regimes is also apparent in other areas. For 
instance, the line of reasoning in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Mox Plant
20
 is 
based on the same misguided premise. The judgment engages in an esoteric and convo-
luted analysis of what the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) signified for the exercise of the Union’s competence, even though the 
wide scope of the duty of cooperation had already been established.
21
 
 
3  The Other End of the Spectrum: The Lack of Comity in the Application of 
BITs 
The above section highlighted a maximalist quality which characterises a specific line of 
attack against intra-EU BITs. Arbitral tribunals, however, have been similarly difficult in 
their approach to the coexistence of the EU legal order with BITs.  
The Micula saga is a case in point. A first point of tension appears in the approach of 
the Arbitral Tribunal to the issues of enforceability of the award and the interpretation of 
EU law. In relation to the former, both Romania and the European Commission raised 
concerns about the award of damages. On the one hand, Romania stressed the state aid 
nature of any damages award and the ensuing obligation of national authorities to inform 
the Commission in accordance with the Union’s state aid rules. On the other hand, the 
Commission underlined the public order nature of the EU competition rules, already 
stressed in Eco Swiss,
22
 and pointed out the difficulties that national courts would face 
when asked to enforce the award: whilst bound by Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention 
                                                      
19
  See also Strik (n 1) 217. 
20
  CJEU, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635. 
21
  See the criticism in Koutrakos (n 14) 185-6. 
22
  CJEU, Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss [1999] ECR I-3055 paras 36-39. 
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to treat the award as if it were a final judgment of a national court, they would also be 
bound by the supremacy of EU law and their duty to refer to the Court of Justice. The 
Commission also pointed out a further complicating factor, that is the fact that, whilst the 
Union’s Member States were bound by the ICSID Convention, the EU itself was not. 
The Arbitral Tribunal did not address these concerns. In fact, it did not engage with 
either their substance or their implications. Instead, it considered them irrelevant, as it 
held as follows: ‘it is not desirable to embark on predictions as to the possible conduct of 
various persons and authorities after the Award has been rendered, especially but no ex-
clusively when it comes to enforcement matters. It is thus inappropriate for the Tribunal 
to base its decisions in this case on matters of EU law that may come to apply after the 
Award has been rendered’.23  
Instead, the Arbitral Tribunal merely duplicated the text of Articles 53 and 54 ICSID 
Convention.
24
 By distinguishing between the legality of national conduct under the BIT 
rules and the practical difficulties of enforcing the arbitral award, the Tribunal may ap-
pear to focus on the narrow issue of compliance with international law. Its approach, 
however, as illustrated by the striking economy of the above extract, is unduly formalis-
tic. It ignores the fiendishly complex legal framework within which national courts would 
be called upon to enforce the award whilst they would struggle to identify their obliga-
tions under parallel and interacting sets of rules. The Tribunal refused to engage with this 
                                                      
23
  Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award (11 December 2013) para. 340.  
24
  Article 53 ICSID Convention reads as follows: ‘(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and 
shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Conven-
tion. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that en-
forcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention. (2) For the 
purposes of this Section, “award” shall include any decision interpreting, revising or annulling such 
award pursuant to Articles 50, 51 or 52’. Article 54 ICSID Convention reads as follows: ‘(1) Each 
Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and en-
force the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such 
an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if 
it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.’ 
 9 
legal context, hence providing no assistance to either the State which was found to have 
violated its BIT obligation, or the national court.  
A similar lack of engagement is provided in the reasoning of both the Arbitral Tribu-
nal and the ICSID ad hoc Committee in Micula regarding the interpretation of substan-
tive EU law. In particular, there are two problems with their approach. The first is about 
the Tribunal’s understanding of the application of EU law in Romania. The European 
Commission relied upon the state aid provisions of the Europe Agreement between the 
then EEC and its Member States and Romania
25
 in order to stress the legal context within 
which the Sweden-Romania BIT should be interpreted (and which the Arbitral Tribunal 
had allegedly ignore). Admittedly, some of these provisions were somewhat vague and 
imposed only an obligation of result. For instance, Article 69 of the Europe Agreement 
with Romania provided as follows:  
 
The Parties recognize that an important condition for Romania's economic integra-
tion into the Community is the approximation of Romania's existing and future legis-
lation to that of the Community. Romania shall endeavour to ensure that its legisla-
tion will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 
 
Similarly, Article 70 referred specifically to competition law as an area where ap-
proximation should be achieved. Article 64 of the Agreement, however, refers expressly 
to state aid and the specific criteria set out in the Union’s primary rules. Whilst, the latter 
rules were not applicable as such to Romania prior to its accession to the EU, they were 
intrinsically linked to the set of international rules laid down in the Europe Agreement. 
As such, they placed Romania’s legislation in a specific legal context. To ignore this, as 
the Arbitral Tribunal did in Micula, was unduly formalistic. It was also inconsistent with 
the Tribunal’s own pronouncements about the place of EU law in its award. It held, for 
instance, that ‘the general context of EU accession must be taken into account when in-
terpreting the BIT’ and that ‘the overall circumstances of EU accession may play a role in 
                                                      
25
  [1994] OJ L 357/2 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part. 
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determining whether’ Romania breached its BIT obligations.26 In this vein, it held that 
‘the overall context of EU accession in general and the pertinent provisions of EU law in 
particular may be relevant to the determination of whether, inter alia, Romania’s actions 
were reasonable in light of all the circumstances, or whether Claimants’ expectations 
were legitimate’.27 And yet, the award is characterized by a distinct lack of engagement 
with this context. This lack of engagement is also striking in the ad hoc Committee’s De-
cision on Annulment.  
The analysis in this article does not suggest that arbitral bodies ought to accept the 
arguments put forward by the Commission in order to buttress the supremacy of EU law 
in its interactions with international investment law. It points out, however, the distinct 
lack of engagement with the practical realities within which these complex legal issues 
are raised. This is problematic in the complex system of parallel and interacting legal 
regimes. As Bermann points out, ‘[a]ccommodation techniques play a vital role in a 
world populated with multiple international legal orders and multiple first principles’28. 
After all, this lack of engagement is by no means the only option for the arbitral bod-
ies. A case in point is the approach of the Arbitral Tribunal in European American In-
vestment Bank AG v Slovakia.
29
 Whilst the Tribunal rejected all the jurisdictional objec-
tions put forward by both the Commission and Slovakia, it engaged with them and its 
award on jurisdiction illustrated an understanding of the concerns that may be raised in 
the EU context. For instance, it addressed the arguments about the force of the Court of 
Justice’s rejection of the jurisdiction of a Patent Court in Opinion 1/09 and made it clear 
that it had no power to determine the validity of an act of an EU institution.
30
 In doing so, 
the Arbitral Tribunal adopts an approach similar to that underpinning the Kadi case-law 
of the Court of Justice: it is recalled, that in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P 
Kadi and Al Barakaat, the Court distinguished between the international legal order (the 
                                                      
26
  Micula (n 23) para 327. 
27
  ibid para 328. 
28
  George Bermann, ‘Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration’ (2012) 28 Arbitra-
tion International 397, 445. 
29
  European American Investment Bank AG v Slovakia, PCA Case No 2010-17, Award on Jurisdiction 
(22 October 2012). 
30
  ibid para 263. 
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rules of which were set out in UN Security Council Resolutions and implemented by the 
EU on the basis of the contested secondary measures) and the Union legal order (within 
which the EU Courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction).
31
 It was in the light of that separation 
that the Court held that its power to rule on the consistency of EU measures implement-
ing a UNSC resolution with a higher rule of law in the EU legal order would not entail 
any power to rule on the legality of the UN Resolution itself.  
The engagement of the Arbitral Tribunal in European American Investment Bank AG 
v Slovakia with the EU law is illustrated in other ways too. The Tribunal pointed out that, 
within the UNCITRAL framework, ‘it is possible to have infringement proceedings in the 
case of awards of arbitral tribunals constituted under the BIT like this Tribunal, at the 
stage of enforcement in the European Union’32 and stressed that ‘the ECJ maintains the 
possibility, through different mechanisms, to have the final and authoritative word on the 
interpretation of EU law’.33 In fact, it is interesting that the Tribunal should go out of its 
way to suggest that the existence of a parallel arbitration-based mechanism need not raise 
problems for either the interpretation or application of EU law.
34
 This approach illustrates 
a clear nod to comity that needs to underpin the relationship between independent judicial 
bodies entrusted with the parallel adjudication of interlocking sets of transnational law.  
The lack of engagement with EU law characterizing the approach of the Arbitral Tri-
bunal and the ICSID ad hoc Committee in Micula also extends, somewhat bizarrely, to 
national courts. Once the Arbitral Tribunal in Micula awarded the claimants $250m in 
damages, they brought an action before the Bucharest Tribunal seeking to enforce the 
award. In May 2014, the national court allowed the execution of the award. Once the 
Romanian authorities challenged this decision, the Bucharest Tribunal stayed the execu-
tion of the Award pending a decision on the merits of the challenge. The Commission 
intervened in these proceedings and argued that either the enforcement of the award 
should be annulled or that a reference should be made to the Court of Justice pursuant to 
                                                      
31
  CJEU, Case C-402/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commis-
sion [2008] ECR I-6351, paras 287-288. 
32
  ibid.  
33
  ibid para 266 
34
  ibid.  
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Article 267 TFEU. On 13 October 2014, the Bucharest Tribunal declined to refer to the 
Court of Justice (and five weeks later it also rejected Romania’s main action against the 
execution of the Award). The refusal to refer followed two weeks after the Commission 
had opened the formal investigation procedure against Romania pursuant to Article 
108(2) TFEU in respect of the partial implementation of the Award by Romania that took 
place in early 2014.
35
 
It is clear that the Bucharest Tribunal was not in an easy position. The award was 
binding pursuant to Article 54 of the ICSID Convention and the national court ought to 
deal with it as if it were a final judgment of a Romanian court. Furthermore, as a court of 
first instance, it enjoyed complete discretion as to whether to refer to the Court of Justice 
under Article 267 TFEU.
36
 It is, however, striking that the Bucharest court should not 
have felt the need to refer for a matter of such legal complexity.
37
 This is all the more so 
given the initiation of the state aid investigation by the Commission which had rendered 
the concrete clash between EU and international investment law all but inevitable. This 
conduct of the national court amounted to a breach of the duty of cooperation that is laid 
down in Article 4(3) TFEU and lies at the core of the preliminary reference procedure. 
The Court of Justice has repeatedly emphasized the central role of national courts in the 
Union’s system of judicial architecture: in Opinion 1/09, it referred to them as 'the guard-
ians of [the Union] legal order and [its] judicial system',
38
 and held that 'the tasks attribut-
ed to [them] are indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of the law estab-
                                                      
35
  State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) [2014] OJ C 393/27 Procedures Relating to the Imple-
mentation of the competition policy, State aid Romania. 
36
  See, amongst others, CJEU, Case C-166/73, Rheinmühlen [1974] ECR I-33, para 4 and Case C-
251/11, Huet ECLI:EU:C:2012:133 para 24. 
37
  For the view that national courts ought to take into account EU law and refer to the Court of Justice 
in the context of ICSID disputes, see Markus Burgstaller, ‘European Law Challenges to Investment 
Arbitration’ in Michael Waibel et al (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer 
Law International 2010) 455, 473, Hanno Wehland, ‘Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitra-
tion: Is European Community Law an Obstacle?’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 297 and Thomas Eilmansberger, 
‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law’ (2009) 46 CMLR 383, 428.   
38
  CJEU, Case C-1/09 Opinion delivered pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU - Draft agreement - Crea-
tion of a unified pa-tent litigation system - European and Community Patents Court - Compatibility 
of the draft agreement with the Treaties [2011] ECR I-1137 para 66. 
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lished by the Treaties'.
39
 It is nothing short of staggering that the Bucharest Tribunal 
should have felt sufficiently confident to ignore the controversial issues raised by the 
interactions between EU and international investment law in the dispute before it and to 
consider it unnecessary to rely upon the judicial dialogue avenue open to it pursuant to 
Article 267 TFEU.  
This section has referred to bodies responsible for the application and interpretation 
of international rules and has outlined instances of distinct reluctance to engage with the 
subtleties and complexities raised by the interaction of these rules with EU law. Such an 
approach may appear to be, at best, not receptive and, at worst, hostile to any claim to 
legal exceptionalism that the EU may be seen to make for itself. As such, it may appear 
to be justifiable in the light of what many view as the increasingly strident approach of 
the Court of Justice – a court which is prepared to show deference to international law 
only in so far as it suits the strengthening of its own jurisdiction. The charge is that the 
Court acts as ‘the gatekeeper’40 which chooses which parts of international law may pen-
etrate the EU legal order and be enforced against secondary measures, as, in fact, it is 
‘highly reluctant to give any effect to international law’.41 This criticism has been lev-
elled not only in relation to the direct effect of international agreements within the EU 
legal order but also in other fields where EU law interacts with international law. In par-
ticular, two areas have attracted considerable criticism, namely the Court’s approach in 
the Mox Plant case,
42
 and the endlessly discussed Kadi line of cases.
43
 The latter has been 
criticised as ‘inward-looking’ and at odds with ‘the self-presentation of the EU as an or-
                                                      
39
  ibid para 85. 
40
  See Marise Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the European Union’ in Paul 
Craig and Grainne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 217, 242. 
41
  Jan Klabbers, The European Union in International Law (Pedone 2012) 77. See also Giorgio Gaja, 
‘Trends in Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint Relating to Community Agreements’ in En-
zo Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer 2002) 118, 
128–30 
42
  CJEU, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635. 
43
  CJEU, Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351 and 
subsequent case-law. 
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ganization which maintains particular fidelity to international law and institutions’,44 and 
the latter is viewed as indicative of a broader approach which enables the Court of Justice 
to be, at best, selective in its reliance upon and application of international law.
45
  
The picture that emerges from the Court’s case-law, however, is somewhat subtler. A 
case in point is the judgment in Mox Plant (a reflection on the Kadi case-law will be of-
fered in the following section). This judgment is relied upon frequently in order to sub-
stantiate the exclusivity of the Union’s judiciary in relation to any other international ad-
judication system where EU law may pertain to an international law dispute. Whilst the 
judgment in Mox Plant is unnecessarily complex and its analysis esoteric,
46
 it ought to be 
viewed within the specific legal and factual context within which it was rendered. First, 
this was a judgment rendered in an interstate dispute, and in particular a dispute that in-
volved two Member States. This was not a dispute about an individual seeking to enforce 
rights conferred by an international treaty against a State. Secondly, the international trea-
ty in question that set up an independent dispute settlement system sanctioned, as an al-
ternative, recourse to the EU enforcement proceedings.
47
 Thirdly, at no point was there 
any doubt that the Irish government had submitted a number of EU secondary measures 
to the Arbitral Tribunal so that the latter would interpret and apply them to the dispute 
before it. In other words, what the Court of Justice dismissed as illegal in Mox Plant was 
recourse to a dispute settlement system which would create the risk of disjunction be-
tween the interpretation of EU law by the Court of Justice and the Arbitral Tribunal in a 
context where international law itself had rendered such a risk entirely avoidable. Viewed 
from this angle, there is no reason why the Court should not have exercised its jurisdic-
tion to interpret and apply EU law and the duty of cooperation between Member States in 
that context. 
                                                      
44
  Grainne de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the International Legal Order: A Re-evaluation’ in Grainne de 
Búrca and Joseph HH Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2012) 105, 
140. 
45
  Jan Klabbers, ‘Volkerrechtsfreundlich? International Law and the Union Legal Order’ in Panos 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy—Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2011) 
95. 
46
  See Panos Koutrakos (n 14) 184-191. 
47
  Art 282 UNCLOS. 
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In the light of the above, the lack of engagement illustrated by Arbitral Tribunals and 
national courts alike in Micula undermine the smooth management of the interactions 
between international investment law and EU law whilst lacking in understanding of the 
subtleties of the EU courts’ approach to the international law.  
 
4  Testing the Limits in a Politically Charged Environment  
The Arbitral Tribunal Award in Micula has given rise to a series of responses which have 
challenged the relationship between EU and international investment law in different 
ways and before various fora. On the one hand, the European Commission decided that 
the payment of the compensation awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal would be illegal under 
EU law as it would constitute State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU.
48
 It also held 
that Romania should recovered any compensation it had already paid to the Micula 
brothers in implementation of the award.  This Decision has been challenged by the Mic-
ula brothers before the General Court of the European Union, alleging, amongst others, 
violation of Article 351 TFEU and general principles of law, as well as incorrect applica-
tion of the state aid rules. 
49
 
On the other hand, the Micula brothers have sought to enforce the award before na-
tional courts in United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, as well as in Ro-
mania. They have also brought proceedings in the United States where the District Court 
of the Southern District of New York recognised the award, a judgment which is under 
appeal by Romania. In the proceedings before the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, the European Commission has submitted an amicus curiae brief in which it ar-
gues that the judgment under appeal was ‘jurisprudentially imprudent’, as it ignored the 
principle of international comity.
50
  
In the light of the proliferation of disputes between different fora, the Micula saga 
reveals the tensions between EU and international investment law in unusually stark col-
ours. This development may be explained by the reluctance of the dispute settlement bod-
                                                      
48
  Commission Decision 2015/1470 on State aid SA (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Romania 
– Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 2013 [2015] OJ L 232/43. 
49
  GC, Case T-694/15, Micula/Commission and GC, Case T-704/15 Micula and others/Commission. 
50
  http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7096.pdf, p18. 
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ies involved to engage with the complex legal context of the case, and the refusal of Ro-
manian courts to have recourse to the preliminary reference procedure. Another factor 
which has contributed to the testing of the limits of the relationship between EU and in-
ternational investment law is the non-applicability of a public policy clause, similar to 
that of Article V(1)(c) and (3) and II(b) of the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) which could have given a way out of the 
impasse on the basis of the Eco Swiss judgment.
51
  
As far as the European Commission is concerned, its willingness to test the limits of 
the interactions between EU law and international investment of law ought to be viewed 
within a wider policy context. This has been dominated by both activism about the devel-
opment of the Union’s international investment policy and confidence about the reach 
and nature of that policy. These characteristics are apparent at policy-making and judicial 
levels. As far as the former is concerned, the Commission’s intense activity in negotiating 
investment chapters with third countries (negotiations have been finalized regarding the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada and the Agreements with 
Singapore and Vietnam) is matched by its efforts to introduce a new system of invest-
ment dispute settlement which would replace arbitral tribunals with an investment 
court.
52
 The provisions of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
and the Agreement with Vietnam provide for the establishment of an investment court for 
investor-State disputes.
53
 In fact, the new provisions on investor-State dispute settlement 
in CETA include provisions which appear to cater for the type of situation we are now 
                                                      
51
  CJEU, Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd [1999] ECR I-3055. 
52
  Investment Protection and Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP) (12 November 2015).  
53
  See Frank Hoffmeister and Gabriela Alexandru, ‘A First Glimpse of Light on the Emerging Invisi-
ble EU Model BIT’ (2014) 15 JWIT 379. 
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facing in Micula.
54
 The Commission has, furthermore, argued that the Union’s interna-
tional investment policy falls within the Unions’ exclusive competence pursuant both to 
Article 207 TFEU on the Common Commercial Policy and the TFEU provisions on 
movement of capital (currently examined in Opinion 2/15 in the context of the EU’s Free 
Trade Agreement with Singapore). At the time of writing, the case is still pending. Suf-
fice it, however, to make two points. First, in its submissions in Opinion 2/15, the Euro-
pean Commission puts forward a remarkably broad construction of foreign direct invest-
ment under 207 TFEU and of portfolio investment under Article 63 TFEU and it articu-
lates it with notable force. Secondly, this is an issue of acute sensitivity for Member 
States: it is recalled, for instance, that in its Lisbon Treaty judgment, the German Consti-
tutional Court expressly rejected a broad reading of the Union’s exclusive competence in 
the area of investment.
55
  
Viewed along the enforcement actions against five Member States for the alleged in-
compatibility of their BITs with other Member States, this activity illustrates the Com-
mission’s confidence about the Union’s emerging role as an international investment ac-
tor and the role of EU law in the development of the broad scope and intensity of this 
policy.  
On the other hand, the tensions that emerge from the interactions between EU and in-
ternational investment law may put Member States in an unenviable position. The Micula 
case illustrates this in stark terms, as compliance with its international obligations pursu-
ant to its BIT with Sweden would entail for Romania a violation of the EU’s state aid law 
and the principle of supremacy. The Arbitral Tribunal, the ICSID ad hoc Committee, its 
                                                      
54
  Art 8.9(3) of Ceta-Text: ‘For greater certainty, a Party’s decision not to issue, renew or maintain a 
subsidy: (a) in the absence of any specific commitment under law or contract to issue, renew, or 
maintain that subsidy; or (b) in accordance with any terms of conditions attached to the issuance, re-
newal or maintenance of the subsidy, does not constitute a breach of the provisions of this Section’. 
Article 8.9(4): ‘For greater certainty, nothing in this Section shall be construed as preventing a Party 
from discontinuing the granting of a subsidy or requesting its reimbursement where such measure is 
necessary in order to comply with international obligations between the Parties or has been ordered 
by a competent court, administrative tribunal or other competent authority, or requiring that Party to 
compensate the investor therefor.” 
55
  German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08, Judgment (30 June 2009) para 379.  
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national courts, and the European Commission appear to pull Romania in opposite direc-
tions by requiring that it comply with seemingly irreconcilable legal positions.  
This phenomenon, however, is by no means unique where interacting legal orders 
raise fundamental questions about EU law and its position in the international system. 
One may recall, for instance, the case-law in Kadi where in effect, EU law was criticized 
for rendering it impossible for Member States, as a matter of EU law, to comply with 
their international law obligations under the UN Charter to give effect to the UN Security 
Council Resolutions setting out the smart sanctions regime against private parties. This is 
not, however, what happened in practical terms. Mr Kadi was listed in October 2001, the 
Court of Justice rendered the judgment in Kadi I in September 2008, and Mr Kadi was 
delisted in October 2012,
56
 that is nine months before the Court rendered its judgment in 
Kadi II.
57
 At no point during this long period was the EU forced to ignore the UN 
measures requiring that Member States freeze his assets.
58
 The pronouncement of the 
illegality of the EU implementing regulations, therefore, did not entail a violation of in-
ternational law by the Member States. In fact, at no point during the long period of the 
Kadi saga were either the EU or the Member States forced to ignore the UN measures 
requiring that national authorities freeze the assets of the applicants.  
Instead, the case-law of the Court of Justice on Kadi provided the catalyst for the de-
velopment of the sanctions system at UN level and its gradual adjustment in order to be-
come more transparent and fair. There is another factor at play here which makes this 
parallel quite interesting: when the judgment in Kadi I was rendered, there had already 
been considerable disquiet amongst international lawyers and policy-makers about the 
design and functioning of the UN sanctions system. Viewed from this angle, far from 
signaling detachment from international law, the case-law on Kadi illustrates active en-
gagement with its development.  
                                                      
56
  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 933/2012 [2012] OJ L278/11, following a decision by 
the Sanctions Committee (SC/10785 of 5 October 2012). 
57
  CJEU, Joined cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
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Law”: Sewing the Seamless Coat of Compliance’ in Ester Herlin-Karnell and Claudio Matera (eds), 
External Dimension of the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy (2014) CLEER Working Paper 2014/2 33. 
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There is an interesting similarity in the charged and strongly politicized context with-
in which the EU courts are asked to adjudicate on the issues in the Kadi litigation, on the 
one hand, and those raised by the EU-international investment dispute settlement cases, 
on the other hand. The former questioned the transparency of international and suprana-
tional mechanisms which impinged on fundamental human rights. The latter has emerged 
at a time of a lively debate about the very function of arbitral tribunals in international 
relations, including issues about the transparency of their work, the absence of appellate 
procedures, their impingement on the States’ right to regulate and their broad construc-
tion of indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. Whilst by no means nov-
el,
59
 this crisis has attracted considerable attention beyond the confines of academia and 
legal practice in the context of the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership between the EU and the United States. So overwhelming had the disquiet 
been, that the Commission carried out an online opinion survey in 2014 about the inves-
tor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). In its report, the Commission pointed out that the ‘collective submis-
sions reflect a wide-spread opposition to investor-State dispute settlement … in TTIP or 
in general’.60 
It is against the above politically charged and controversial context
61
 that the Com-
mission has sought to reshape the Union’s approach to ICSID by doing away with the 
traditional role of arbitral tribunals and by proposing a permanent investment court in its 
                                                      
59
  See Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73 Fordham LRev 1521 and Julie Mau-
pin, ‘Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky’ in Andrea 
Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds), Transparency in International Law (CUP 2013) 142. 
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(TTIP), SWD (2015) 3 final (13 January 2015) 14.  
61
  For a contribution to the debate about a reformed ISDS system see Jean E Kalicki and Anna Joubin-
Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System – Journeys for the 21st Century 
(Brill Nijhoff 2015).  
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negotiations with third countries.
62
 Viewed from this angle, it is interesting that the Joint 
Statement of the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and the Canadian Interna-
tional Trade Minister Chrystia Freeland should have explained the reformed settlement 
system in CETA as follows: ‘We have responded to Canadians, EU citizens, and busi-
nesses with a fairer, more transparent, system’.63 In the light of the above, it is also inter-
esting that the European Commission should have chosen to address directly the prob-
lems raised by the interactions between EU and intra-EU BITs by challenging head-on 
both the arbitral award in Micula and the existing BITS of certain Member States.  
In the light of the above, the Court of Justice has been asked to adjudicate on the 
foundations of the interactions between EU law and investor-State dispute settlement 
rules in two ways: first, pursuant to the annulment actions brought in Micula under Arti-
cle 263 TFEU against the EU Decision declaring the enforcement of the arbitral award 
illegal state aid; secondly, pursuant to the enforcement actions under Article 258 TFEU 
against Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden about the failure of the 
latter to terminate their intra-EU BITs. There is a third context in which similar questions 
have been raised, that is the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU. In 
March 2016, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) made a reference 
about the compatibility with EU law of the dispute settlement mechanism laid down in 
the BIT between Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands. This reference was made in the 
context of the Eureko dispute where an arbitral tribunal ruled that Slovakia was had 
breached the above BIT and was liable for compensation of € 22.1m, excluding interest.64 
The Bundesgerichtshof raised questions about the compatibility of the dispute settlement 
system set out in the intra-EU BIT with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
(Article 344 TFEU), the preliminary reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU), and the 
non-discrimination principle (Article 18 TFEU). 
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The reference from the Bundesgerichtshof suggests that the decentralised system of 
application of EU law is sufficiently flexible to avoid open and irreversible conflicts. It is 
recalled that the referring court was involved because of an appeal against a judgment of 
the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt which had dismissed the objection of inapplica-
bility raised by Slovakia.
65
 It had held, instead, that Slovakia was bound by the BIT in 
question and had to comply with the arbitral award. The Frankfurt court had not consid-
ered it necessary to refer to the Court of Justice, as it had found the interpretation of the 
EU law issues raised by Article 344 TFEU inapplicable. By relying upon Article 267 
TFEU, the Bundesgerichtshof brought the EU law issues pertaining to the dispute before 
the most appropriate forum for their resolution.  
 
5  The Quest for Managing the Relationship Effectively 
It follows from the above analysis that the interactions between intra-EU BITs and EU 
law play out in an ever wider canvass (involving courts in third states as well as national 
and transnational courts and arbitral tribunals), in a variety of procedural settings, with 
increasing intensity and in a politically charged environment.  
A persisting question is how to square the circle that the increasingly polemical ap-
proach of the actors involved may appear to make almost impossible. It has been argued 
that a viable way to manage the relationship of EU law and arbitral awards is a principle 
similar to that underpinning the relationship between the EU and the ECHR. In particular, 
it has been suggested that the Bosphorus principle
66
 may well provide a compass which 
would enable both strands of law to develop whilst not impinging upon each other.
67
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Such a principle would enable the two systems to develop in harmony and would only 
bite in cases of gross violations.
68
  
Whilst this principle illustrates a comity-based modus vivendi between international 
courts, it is worth-pointing out the specific context within which it has emerged. It is by 
no means easy to define the outer limits of a principle which would enable the relevant 
judicial actors to co-exist in harmony. In the case of the EU-ECHR relationship, the Bos-
phorus principle was developed against the backdrop of the long and steady case-law of 
the Court of Justice on human rights: first introducing them and then rendering them at 
the very core of the EU legal order under the watchful eye of national constitutional 
courts.
69
  
More generally, even in international legal systems long accustomed to coexisting on 
the basis of comity, tensions emerge which test the relationship and place both national 
and international courts in a difficult position. The Response of the Court of Justice, for 
instance, to the EU’s accession to ECHR in Opinion 2/13 illustrates this point all too 
clearly.
70
 Another case in point is, again, the EU-ECHR relationship in the light of the 
application of the Dublin Regulation
71
 which has given rise to two strands of case-law 
which may appear at first sight to be irreconcilable. On the one hand, the Court of Justice 
has interpreted the principle of mutual confidence, that is the very foundation of the Reg-
ulation, broadly and would only allow deviations in the light of systemic deficiencies, a 
term which it has construed narrowly.
72
 On the other hand, the European Court of Human 
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Rights  (ECtHR) appeared to prescribe a considerably lower threshold, as it required ‘a 
thorough and individualised examination of the situation of the person concerned’ in the 
context of transfers under the Dublin Regulation.
73
 In doing so, the ECtHR did not refer 
to the strict approach to exceptions from the principle of mutual trust adopted by the 
Court of Justice in Case C-394/12, Abdullahi. What complicates matters further is that, in 
that specific context, national authorities applying the Dublin II rules would not be sub-
ject to the Bosphorus presumption about protection equivalent to ECHR standards, as the 
presumption applies in areas where Member States do not enjoy discretion under EU law, 
which is not the case under the Dublin Regulation.
74
  
How are national courts to square this circle between two seemingly irreconcilable 
approaches? English courts have been trying to do so by reading both lines of case-law 
narrowly and within their specific factual and legal context.
75
 The reluctance, however, of 
the ECJ and ECtHR to engage expressly with the points of tension between the two 
strands of their case-law puts national courts in a difficult position. No international legal 
system would benefit if national courts were tempted to engage in an idiosyncratically 
creative interpretation in order to avoid choosing between seemingly conflicting require-
ments.  
Another option that has been raised in order to ensure a more efficient management 
of the interactions between EU and international investment law is the establishment of 
direct linkages between arbitral tribunals and the Court of Justice. In particular, it has 
been suggested that the former should be deemed to constitute courts in the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU and, therefore, should have the right to refer to the Court of Justice.
76
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This adjustment of the preliminary reference procedure found favour with Advocate 
General Wathelet who, in his Opinion of in Case C-567/14 noted in a footnote that such a 
solution ‘could help to ensure the correct and effective implementation of EU law’.77 In 
its judgment, the Court did not refer to this issue.
78
 The questions that it may raise not-
withstanding,
79
 such a solution illustrates an effort to introduce legal techniques aiming to 
the efficient management of the interactions between EU and international investment 
law.  
 
6  Conclusion  
The relevance of EU law to disputes before arbitration tribunals have raised questions 
about the coexistence of interacting legal orders and the parallel exercise of competing 
jurisdiction of international judicial bodies. Whilst not without tensions, these interac-
tions have been managed so far on the ground, without causing a crisis, and with no di-
rect involvement from the European Court of Justice.  A combination of cases, however, 
raised in different procedural settings have rendered the Court at the centre of the interac-
tions between the EU legal order and the sets of rules and procedures laid down in intra-
EU BITs.  
As far as the EU is concerned, navigating these waters on the basis of pragmatic and 
flexible arrangements would be by no means unprecedented. After all, the European Un-
ion legal order has developed pursuant to compromises which the principal institutional 
actors have acknowledged tacitly whilst avoiding to test their limits in practice. The gen-
esis and development of the protection of human rights in the EU legal order, for in-
stance, owe their success to this deeply pragmatic and inherently flexible process of mu-
tual understanding between national, EU and international actors.  
It remains to be seen whether the relationship between EU and international invest-
ment law would develop in the context of intra-EU BITs along similar lines. At this junc-
ture, suffice it to point out that, should the answer be affirmative, the success of such de-
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velopment would depend on the cooperation of the interacting judicial actors (CJEU, 
arbitral tribunals, national courts) – their understanding that their jurisdiction is not exer-
cised in isolation from other transnational legal regimes, their confidence to acknowledge 
their interactions with each other, and their willingness to accommodate these interac-
tions would be vital. Similarly, there is a price to pay for avoiding open conflicts, that is 
an inherent uncertainty. The cooperation of different judicial actors along the lines sug-
gested above would require a leap of faith from each one of them which would render the 
quest for complete certainty elusive. It takes confidence for a legal system to tolerate this 
state of affairs. The alternative, however, would lead to open conflicts which both the EU 
legal order and international investment law can ill afford.  
 
